Liang Wengen, chairman of the privately owned heavy machinery producer Sany Group 每 and according toForbes, China＊s richest man 每 may soon embark on a more prominent political career.
According to Sany Group executives, the Communist Party of China＊s (CPC) powerful organisation department completed its evaluation of Liang last week. Liang has been a member of the National People＊s Congress (NPC), the country＊s highest legislative body, since 1998. A successful examination could bring Liang into the exclusive Central Committee, the core political circle of the CPC, by 2012. If appointed, Liang will be the first private entrepreneur to achieve membership in such a high-level Party organ.
It is not uncommon for businessmen to join the political elite. In fact, the NPC and the country＊s political consultancy body 每 the Chinese People＊s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 每 have long counted among their members a number of well-known leaders of both nationally and locally administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as well as leaders of large private enterprises who enjoy state backing.
The commingling of political and business elites has also been highlighted in recent years by the increasing frequency of leaders＊ movements between regional political positions and SOEs.
Liang＊s bid, however, shows that the trend is growing, both in terms of the number of leaders being appointed to political positions and the Party ranking they can reach 每 a trend perhaps encouraged by the Party itself. Unlike the NPC and CPPCC, which have functions and voting rights subordinate to the Party and which are largely symbolic, the CPC Central Committee carries great political significance.
Liang also stands out for his background as a private entrepreneur. The CPC has traditionally been wary about private enterprises that fall largely outside the state＊s control. This wariness has resulted in a number of economic policy constraints and the exclusion of private entrepreneurs from the political system. However, as private entities grew significantly in number, and their influence on the country＊s economy expanded, the CPC increasingly realised the importance of assimilating them into political institutions.
This has strengthened the CPC＊s political control and prevented instability while at the same time enhancing the Party＊s legitimacy by allowing it to assimilate a greater variety of social classes.
The introduction of the ※Three Represents§ theory in 2000 marked a political milestone by inviting private entrepreneurs into Party membership for the first time. This has accompanied a gradual loosening of restrictions on party membership for private entrepreneurs in recent years. A large number of private businessmen have since become party members and advanced in political rank, meaning the voices of the private sector now could, to a certain degree, help shape the political agenda.
Liang＊s possible membership in the CPC Central Committee has been largely interpreted as the Party taking another step in the direction of opening up to the private sector and granting private business a greater say in politics. However, it remains hard to tell from this single case whether the Party is encouraging private entrepreneurs to join its core circle. More importantly, the rising political status of leaders of large enterprises contrasts with the constraints that many small- to medium-sized private enterprises (SMEs) still face. In fact, this boosts the perception that the CPC is further favouring the consolidation of larger private enterprises and the large-scale restructuring of small ones in the longer term.
While Liang＊s entry into Party circles could be an encouraging sign for the country＊s private sector 每 considering his background, he could help shape a political agenda more favourably inclined toward private interests 每 it does not necessarily shift Beijing＊s position toward SMEs in the long run. In fact, Beijing＊s long-term perception still favours the consolidation of SMEs into larger enterprises or even their assimilation within SOEs under greater state control. Liang＊s entry might therefore be more of a reflection of the state＊s harnessing of large private enterprises, in the interest of bridging the state-private sector gap.
In the meantime, the simple emergence of commercial activities clashed with 1,000 years of Confucian doctrine, which looks down on commerce. The doctrine instead encourages people, particularly the elite, to enter politics. Under such powerful political and cultural constraints, private business, even from the beginning, was severely squeezed by the state, and businessmen were looked down upon in society. This makes business assets not only extremely vulnerable to state policy but also consistently under blackmail by local power. The alternative, therefore, is for entrepreneurs to seek political cover 每 either through bribes or by embarking on a political career 每 to protect their personal assets.
In the past, seeking such a political career may have been more of an obligation, but at present it could offer businessmen political cover while also helping them maximise business assets. Politicians, meanwhile, hope to derive personal economic benefits from stronger links to the private sector. These attitudes paved the way for the state to create the conditions for the much stronger connection between the state and the business sector that exists today.