The Sino-Vietnamese War or Third Indochina War was a war fought in 1979 between the neighboring countries of the People's Republic of China and Vietnam. After a brief incursion into northern Vietnam, PRC troops withdrew less than a month later, and both sides claimed victory.
Sino-Soviet Split
During the initial stages of the Vietnam War with France, Communist China and Vietnam had close ties, with both having a mutual distrust of the former French rulers of Vietnam. During the conflict both the PRC and the Soviet Union were supplying Vietnam; partners against the common colonialist enemy.
With the death of Stalin, the situation changed. Mao Zedong despised Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, and criticized the Soviet Union's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. This led to increasingly hostile relations, and eventually the Sino-Soviet Split. From this period on Vietnamese communists gradually aligned with the Soviet Union. Both the Soviet Union and China continued to supply what was now North Vietnam during their war against the South, and their U.S., French, and Australian supporters.
The Soviets welcomed this change, and saw Vietnam as a way to demonstrate themselves as the "real power" behind communism in the Far East. In this respect the United States government's fear of the domino effect may have been justified to some extent, as the Soviets were attempting to turn countries towards them. The problem with the U.S. interpretation is that what they saw as a unified and growing chain of Communist expansion was in fact motivated at least as much by Soviet interest in isolating the PRC.
To the PRC the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship was a worrying development. It the seemed very clear that the Soviets were trying to encircle China.
PRC's response was two-fold: for one they started talks with the USA in the late 1960s and early 1970s, culminating in high level meetings with Henry Kissinger and later Richard Nixon. These contributed to a PRC shift toward the American camp. Meanwhile, they also supported the Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol Pot in Cambodia. PRC supported Cambodia partially for ideological reasons (the Khmer Rouge's philosophy was a radical variant of Maoism,) and partially to keep Vietnam "boxed in" between PRC in the north and Cambodia in the west.
The relative success of the two neighboring states would have a powerful effect on opinions of PRC and USSR in the area: After the collapse of the Saigon government in 1975, Vietnam stabilized, while Cambodia descended into genocidal chaos.
Cambodia
Although the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge had once cooperated, the relationship deteriorated when KR leader Pol Pot came to power and established Democratic Kampuchea. The Cambodian regime started to demand certain tracts of land be "returned" to Cambodia, lands that had been "lost" centuries earlier. Unsurprisingly, the Vietnamese refused the demands, and Pol Pot responded by massacring ethnic Vietnamese inside Cambodia (see History of Cambodia), and, by 1978, supporting a Vietnamese guerrilla army making incursions into western Vietnam.
Realizing that Cambodia was being supported by the PRC, Vietnam approached the Soviets about possible actions. The Soviets saw this as a major opportunity; the Vietnamese army, fresh from combat with the US's ground forces, would be able to easily defeat the Cambodian forces. This would not only remove the only major PRC-aligned political force in the area, but at the same time demonstrate the benefits of being aligned with the USSR. The Vietnamese were equally excited about the potential outcome; Laos was already a strong ally; if Cambodia could be "turned," Vietnam would emerge as a major regional superpower, political master of the majority of Indochina.
Of course the PRC would not be terribly happy with this course of events, and their possible counteractions had to be considered. Over a period of several months in 1978, the Soviets made it clear that they were supporting the Vietnamese against Cambodian incursions. They felt this political show of force would keep the Chinese out of any sort of direct confrontation, allowing the Vietnamese and Cambodians to fight out what was to some extent a Sino-Soviet war by proxy.
In late 1978, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. As expected, their experienced and well-equipped troops had little difficulty brushing the Khmer Rouge forces aside. On January 7, 1979 Vietnamese-backed Cambodian forces seized Phnom Penh, ending the Khmer Rouge regime.
The war
Unknown to the USSR, the PRC, with US backing, was growing increasingly defiant. They felt that there was simply no way the USSR could directly support Vietnam against the PRC; the distances were too great to be effective, and any sort of reinforcement would have to cross territory controlled by the PRC or US allies. The only realistic option open to them would be indirect, re-starting the simmering border war in northern China. Vietnam was important to Soviet policy, but they felt it was not important enough to go to war over.
On February 15, the PRC publicly announced their intention to invade. Few observers realized the symbolic importance of this date; it marked the expiry of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, and thus the first time that the PRC could "legally" invade a Soviet ally without breaking their own treaties. The reason cited for the invasion was the supposed mistreatment of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese minority and the Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands (claimed by the PRC).
Two days later on February 17, a huge force with about 90,000 supported by tanks from the PRC People's Liberation Army crossed into northern Vietnam. Many of Vietnam's elite troops were in Cambodia, keeping a tight grip on its newly occupied territory. The Vietnamese government claimed they only left a force of about 100,000 army regular divisions and border militia units in its northern area. The PLA managed to advance about forty kilometres into Vietnam, with fighting mainly occurring in the provinces of Cao Bang, Lao Cai, and Lang Son. On March 6 the Chinese took Lang Son. They claimed the gate to Hanoi was open and declared their punitive mission achieved, and began withdrawing their forces. By March 16 the process was completed. The Vietnamese declared that they had defeated a Chinese army of 600,000.
To this day, both sides of the conflict described themselves as the victor. The number of casualties is disputed and Vietnamese claimed that the Chinese suffered 60,000 casualties and 20,000 deaths. The Chinese claimed the Chinese casualties at about 20,000 to 30,000 while Vietnamese loss at about 40,000 to 60,000.
There is also debate about who "won" the war in the political sense. The answer most likely depends on what one believes each side's objectives to have been. If PRC's aim was to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, it failed ¡ª while a certain number of troops were pulled out of Cambodia to fight the Chinese, Cambodia remained under Vietnamese military occupation for some time. Similarly, the border disputes between the PRC and Vietnam were not settled. If, however, PRC's goals were entirely punitive, the war may have been more successful. There are also claims that the PRC was seeking to test the resolve of the Soviet Union, which had pledged to defend Vietnam ¡ª if so, this alliance may have been proven hollow, as the Soviet Union provided no direct assistance to Vietnam in the conflict. It may be argued by some, however, that no assistance was needed as both the Soviets and Vietnamese claimed that Vietnam defeated a Chinese army of 600,000.
Aftermath
The legacy of the war is lasting, especially in Vietnam. Occasional skirmishes continued over the border during the 1980s. Relations between the two neighbours were only improved in the early 1990s after the implosion of the Soviet Union.
The war also caused a forced migration of Vietnam's ethnic Chinese, who were discriminated against. They fled as "boat people" and were resettled in several Chinatowns and in other Asian communities in Australia, Europe, and North America.
In the People's Republic of China, this war is not frequently mentioned.
In Vietnamese history textbooks, the war is considered a small border skirmish, which is mentioned by two or three lines. Only the old people in the North of Vietnam know about the war well.
In 1999, China and Vietnam signed a border pact after many years of negotiations, but the line of demarcation remained secret[1]. This pact was vociferously opposed by some Vietnamese from outside Vietnam as well as dissidents in Vietnam. Several dissidents who voiced objection to the treaty were arrested by the Vietnamese government[2], who claimed that the pact does not exist.
- posted on 11/18/2005
The events in the Horn of Africa, which Brzezinski interpreted as part of a Soviet strategy to outflank the oil-rich Persian Gulf so vital to Western economies, encouraged the United States to seek help in balancing Soviet power in the world. The obvious means of doing so was to complete the rapprochement with China begun under Nixon. Some advisers opposed ¡°playing the China card¡± for fear that the Soviets would retaliate by calling off the continuing SALT negotiations, but Brzezinski persuaded the President that closer ties between the United States and China would oblige the U.S.S.R. to court the United States, as had occurred in 1972. Brzezinski went to Peking in May 1978 to initiate discussions leading toward full diplomatic recognition. His cause was aided by important changes in the Chinese leadership. Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong had died in 1976. Hua Guofeng won the initial power struggle and ordered the arrest and trial of the radical Gang of Four led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. Both superpowers hoped that the suppression of radicals in favour of pragmatists in the Chinese government might portend better relations with Peking. The rehabilitation of the formerly condemned ¡°capitalist roader¡± Deng Xiaoping led to a resumption of Soviet¨CChinese border clashes, however, and the clear shift of Vietnam into the Soviet camp strengthened Washington's hand in Peking. Hua and Carter announced in December 1978 that full diplomatic relations would be established on Jan. 1, 1979. The United States downgraded its representation in Taiwan and renounced its 1954 mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist Chinese.
The spectre of a possible Sino-American alliance may have alarmed the Soviets (Brezhnev warned Carter not to sell arms to China) but was never a real possibility. The Chinese remained Communist and distrustful of the United States. They made clear that China was no card to be played at will by one or the other of the superpowers. Nor could China's underdeveloped economy sustain a large conventional war or the projection of force overseas (which the United States would not want in any case), while in nuclear systems China was as weak vis-¨¤-vis the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union had been vis-¨¤-vis the United States in the 1950s. Ties to the United States might provide China with high technology, but the United States was no more willing to place nuclear or missile systems in Chinese hands than Khrushchev had been. To be sure, the United States had an interest in preventing a Sino-Soviet rapprochement (an estimated 11 percent of the Soviet military effort was devoted to the Chinese front), but any pause given the U.S.S.R. by Sino-American cooperation was probably more useful to China than to the United States. Indeed, Peking was quite capable of playing its U.S. card to carry out adventures of its own.
After their 1975 victory the North Vietnamese showed a natural strategic preference for the distant U.S.S.R. and fell out with their historic enemy, neighbouring China. In quick succession Vietnam expelled Chinese merchants, opened Cam Ranh Bay to the Soviet navy, and signed a treaty of friendship with Moscow. Vietnamese troops had also invaded Cambodia to oust the pro-Peking Khmer Rouge. Soon after Deng Xiaoping's celebrated visit to the United States, Peking announced its intention to punish the Vietnamese, and, in February 1979, its forces invaded Vietnam in strength. The Carter administration felt obliged to favour China (especially given residual American hostility to North Vietnam) and supported Peking's offer to evacuate Vietnam only when Vietnam evacuated Cambodia. The Soviets reacted with threats against China, but Chinese forces performed abysmally even against Vietnam's frontier militia, and after three weeks of hard fighting, in which Vietnam claimed to have inflicted 45,000 casualties, the Chinese withdrew. The results for U.S. policy were all negative: Chinese military prestige was shattered, Cambodia remained in the Soviet-Vietnamese camp, and the tactic of playing the China card was rendered ridiculous.
To the chagrin of Peking, the Sino-Vietnamese War failed to forestall a planned U.S.¨CSoviet summit meeting and the signing of a second arms agreement, SALT II. After Carter's first deep-cut proposal, negotiations had resumed on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement and had finally produced a draft treaty. The summit was held in Vienna in June 1979, and Carter returned to seek congressional approval for SALT II as well as most-favoured-nation trade status for both the U.S.S.R. and China. The treaty inspired widespread suspicion in the U.S. Senate on its own merits. The modest limits on nuclear forces and allowances for upgrading existing missiles did not seem sufficient to prevent the Soviets' superior long-range missile forces from threatening the survival of U.S. land-based missiles. The American will to upgrade its own deterrent, meanwhile, seemed to be sapped by the SALT process itself. Confusion reigned over how the MX missile might be deployed so as to survive a Soviet first strike, and Carter cancelled programs to deploy the B-1 strategic bomber and an antitank neutron bomb designed for Europe. There also was widespread doubt over whether Soviet compliance with SALT II could be adequately monitored. The treaty foundered as well on growing American impatience with Communist expansion in the Third World.
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