Re: 由青的《哲学的童心》引出的CND哲学讨论,有关哥德尔 | Nov 10 2004- ϲҲպʶϵͳ۹˸ӣ۵걸иޡ仰˵籾ǿŵģûһһжìܡҵ⡣
óҴطˡЩҲϣCNDϵ˵мֵĻ
ҽͺľʶôһ˼Ķ֤ˣ֤˵Ķû˼(¶) ҳô˵Ļԡ
ܻشıţҲûɻɣȻйᾡйҵľ顣
ѧϵ۵һȺŪͼͯͯԼһЩ
ȻĽЩϵ۵ͼǺ
ͯǶѸƺãΨ
ִЩѧ(ʿ)ûдﵽ֪ʶĶ壬ֻǴﵽ
Ķ塣
ǰľ顣
guanzhong,
Godel۵ʵԴͳо
ͳG.Cantor ˵УȻ{1234......}ļУСļʵ
K.GodelP.J.Cohenֱ֤ͳͳķ뼯۹ϵìܡҲ˵ͳɼ۹ϵȷǼ۹ϵȱݡ
I have also read some books in this regard, including "Godel's Proof". But my question really is whether or not, and how far can we generalize Godel's conclusion proven in a very specific field in mathematics to other fields in math or even beyond. Set theory has been widely used as the foundation of many branches in math. If there exists some inconsistency or incompleteness, why is there no one worried about any potential problem deduced from set theory. I obviously don't know enough to answer this question mathemetically, but I also feel this is more likely a philosophical question than a mathematical one. That was why I raised the question and hoped to get some diiscussion from those who know better.
:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
gadfly д:
óҴطˡЩҲϣCNDϵ˵мֵĻ
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I know there are many souces for this topic (what you call ""). But I would love to be able to DISCUSS some interesting ideas such as consciousness with others who are also interested in the topic. I think you may be right. CND is more of a platform for discussing literature, poems and stuff, not for serious philosophy.
I appreciate the respnse of the two of you I still have a long way to go to earn your title!
Gödel's theorem is quite fundamental therefore is everywhere generalizable. The following paragraph is quoted from Encyclopædia Britannica's article on "Metalogic":
The first and most central finding in this field is that systems such as N are incomplete and incompletable because Gödel's theorem applies to any reasonable and moderately rich system. The proof of this incompleteness may be viewed as a modification of the liar paradox, which shows that truth cannot be defined in the language itself. Since provability in a formal system can often be expressed in the system itself, one is led to the conclusion of incompleteness.
In 1930, Kurt Godel proved that no formal axiomatic system adequate to embrace arithmetic and number theory can be both consistent and complete. If such a system is consistent, then there must be some theorems which can be neither proved nor disproved. 1933, Godel proved a second negative theorem: that there is no constructive procedure whereby an axiomatic system can establish its own consistency, i.e. freedom from internal contradictions.
Ϊ¶֤˼ʷΰijɾ͡
guanzhongҲһϲѧˡллϲƪʷϵѧҲʶλʿ帯Ȼƺ벻ѧ翵»غơѧнصķΣҮµ˵ԶProtagorasӵ۱ǣDiogenesǰȥĹѧDrebenQuineĴӡҲһλˣʮʱһŮѧһ飬ֵǷꡣ
guanzhongѧеѧܹġʵ¶IJȫԶѧ壬Ϳֻǽʾ˹۵ľԡΪֵѧ֧˵ڼ֮ϣǻغصĹףҲ˵϶һ̶ϽʾѧľԡеѧҲ֤һйϵͳDzȫġ¶һ̫֪ijɾ֤һνϵͳȫԡDzɰͼĿѧѧijʵ壬Щʵ壨֪δ֪ѧܺ;ѧĨ稕ռ䨕¶ȫԶʾռ䨕ԭƽ̹ǵĹȫյĸӹ졣Ҫ¶ȫԶĺ壬Ū¶ȫԶݼ֤¶֤Ǻѿνм۵ѵܿȻҪһġ¶IJȫԶ֤Ҳѧһµķ֧Ԫѧһѧķоѧķ֧ѧ⣬ѧΨһһܨҷ˼ѧơ͵¶֤ȥErnest NagelдͨСӨGodel's Proof.лҿܻд㶫ȤĶ߽ܽܡֶܿǺȤԴ߶ԣдĿ
ʶConsciousnessоĿǰѧһȵ㣬guanzhongӦΪѴһۼҶȤоеˡһ飬ЩڲԭεкܴԣϵͳˣҸ˱ȽϲDaniel Dennett ĨMulti-draft model Bernard Baars ĨGlobal workspace theoryDaniel DennettҺϲһλѧҡдѧͨڰѸӵ˼üȤķʽġConsciousness ExplainedһжԵѿĶԪ۵ķdzȤķѿ۶дõġһѿԺıʾĶԪ۵Ļ˵Ҳʮǡ⣬дĨDarwins Dangerous IdeaʹΪߵĵˣҲʹѧҲϲбֳĬǡˡڨmind⣬λרҵʿҽܽܲźá
cnd վѧͿѧ뷨ȻãսֿܻϴξΪѧ˲٣лѵȴࡣѧΪԸںӣԷǺֹ۵㣬Ǻֹ۵㣬Ľ綨⣬ܽۡԼ뵱ȻĹ۵֮ڶԷټԷʽļͬѼ
һЩҵСĵУ˱ԹûȫʷϸɣΪƪСڨܽһ¹ŵѧִѧЩٶСĵı⣬СּʲôñиƻJudy˵һ鶹ɣ˿ˣ˵ףôȫϯζ֪ǷӦƻĹ